added dast options I have researched

.githooks/pre-commit

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+repo_root="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || pwd)"
+"${repo_root}/scripts/check-chart.sh"

.gitignore

@@ -23,3 +23,5 @@ reports/
 .env
 .env.local
 .env.*.local
+
+.amp-usage.db

README.md

@@ -44,18 +44,30 @@ The rendered reference reflects the default values in `helm/values.yaml`, so opt
 
 For fast validation while wiring up infrastructure, use these tools together:
 
-- `helm lint ./helm`
-- `helm template agentguard-ci ./helm`
-- `helm template agentguard-ci ./helm | kubectl apply --dry-run=client -f -`
-- `helm template agentguard-ci ./helm | kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f -`
-- `argo lint rendered.yaml`
+- `./scripts/check-chart.sh`
+- `RUN_KUBECTL_CLIENT_CHECK=1 ./scripts/check-chart.sh`
+- `RUN_KUBECTL_SERVER_CHECK=1 ./scripts/check-chart.sh`
+
+What each mode does:
+
+- `./scripts/check-chart.sh` runs the fast offline checks used by the repo-managed pre-commit hook: `helm lint`, `helm template`, and `argo lint --offline`.
+- `RUN_KUBECTL_CLIENT_CHECK=1 ./scripts/check-chart.sh` adds a client-side `kubectl` dry-run. This is optional because CRD-heavy manifests can still be environment-sensitive here.
+- `RUN_KUBECTL_SERVER_CHECK=1 ./scripts/check-chart.sh` adds a server-side dry-run against your current cluster context, which is the strongest validation once the Argo and Infisical CRDs are installed.
+
+Install the shared git hook once per clone:
+
+```bash
+git config core.hooksPath .githooks
+```
 
 Notes:
 
 - `helm lint` catches Helm chart problems.
-- `kubectl --dry-run=client` catches basic Kubernetes schema issues without talking to the cluster.
-- `kubectl --dry-run=server` is better once the cluster already has the Argo and Infisical CRDs installed.
-- `argo lint` is the most useful Argo-specific check once you have the Argo CLI installed.
+- `helm template` proves the chart renders successfully with the current values.
+- `argo lint --offline` is the most useful Argo-specific local check because it validates the rendered `ClusterWorkflowTemplate` without needing cluster access.
+- `kubectl --dry-run=client` is weaker for CRDs than Argo lint, so it is included as an optional extra check instead of the default hook behavior.
+- `kubectl --dry-run=server` is best once the cluster already has the Argo and Infisical CRDs installed.
+- CI should still rerun the same baseline checks even if pre-commit already passed, because hooks are local and bypassable. The usual CI extra is the server-side `kubectl` dry-run once a cluster with the needed CRDs is available.
 
 ## Installation
 
@@ -101,6 +113,12 @@ If you do not use Infisical, create the `amp-security-pipeline-secrets` secret y
 helm upgrade --install agentguard-ci ./helm -n argo
 ```
 
+## Scope and boundaries
+
+This repository is intentionally focused on **source, IaC, and dependency scanning** before deployment.
+
+It does **not** try to be the full build-signing, deploy-admission, or runtime-security stack. For the explicit boundary, missing controls, and recommended sibling pipeline responsibilities, read [`docs/security-scope.md`](docs/security-scope.md).
+
 ## DefectDojo integration
 
 DefectDojo is not installed by this repository.

docs/dast-options.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+Nuclei - https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei
+
+cli tester with embedded chromium
+sandyaa - https://github.com/securelayer7/sandyaa
+
+pipeline vuln tester, very comprehensive
+darwis-taka - https://hub.docker.com/r/cysecurity/darwis-taka

docs/rendered/default-clusterworkflowtemplate.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+# Rendered reference for the default chart values in helm/values.yaml.
+# This is intended for reading and review, so you can inspect the final Argo object
+# without also mentally evaluating Helm templates.
+#
+# Notes:
+# - Optional storage, DefectDojo, and Infisical resources are omitted because they are
+#   disabled by default.
+# - Argo placeholders such as {{workflow.parameters.repo-url}} are expected and remain
+#   in the rendered object because Argo resolves them at workflow runtime.
+apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
+kind: ClusterWorkflowTemplate
+metadata:
+  name: amp-security-pipeline-v1.0.0
+spec:
+  serviceAccountName: default
+  entrypoint: security-pipeline
+  onExit: pipeline-exit-hook
+  volumeClaimTemplates:
+    - metadata:
+        name: workspace
+      spec:
+        accessModes:
+          - ReadWriteOnce
+        resources:
+          requests:
+            storage: 1Gi
+  arguments:
+    parameters:
+      - name: working-dir
+        value: "."
+      - name: fail-on-cvss
+        value: "7.0"
+      - name: repo-url
+      - name: git-revision
+        value: "main"
+  templates:
+    - name: security-pipeline
+      dag:
+        tasks:
+          - name: clone
+            template: clone-repo
+            arguments:
+              parameters:
+                - name: repo-url
+                  value: "{{workflow.parameters.repo-url}}"
+                - name: git-revision
+                  value: "{{workflow.parameters.git-revision}}"
+          - name: scanners
+            dependencies:
+              - clone
+            template: parallel-scanners
+            arguments:
+              parameters:
+                - name: working-dir
+                  value: "{{workflow.parameters.working-dir}}"
+          - name: enforce-policy
+            dependencies:
+              - scanners
+            template: enforce-policy
+            arguments:
+              parameters:
+                - name: fail-on-cvss
+                  value: "{{workflow.parameters.fail-on-cvss}}"
+    - name: clone-repo
+      inputs:
+        parameters:
+          - name: repo-url
+          - name: git-revision
+      container:
+        image: alpine/git:2.45.2
+        command:
+          - sh
+          - -c
+        args:
+          - git clone --branch "{{inputs.parameters.git-revision}}" --single-branch "{{inputs.parameters.repo-url}}" /workspace
+        volumeMounts:
+          - name: workspace
+            mountPath: /workspace
+    - name: parallel-scanners
+      inputs:
+        parameters:
+          - name: working-dir
+      dag:
+        tasks:
+          - name: trufflehog
+            template: scan-trufflehog
+            arguments:
+              parameters:
+                - name: working-dir
+                  value: "{{inputs.parameters.working-dir}}"
+          - name: semgrep
+            template: scan-semgrep
+            arguments:
+              parameters:
+                - name: working-dir
+                  value: "{{inputs.parameters.working-dir}}"
+          - name: kics
+            template: scan-kics
+            arguments:
+              parameters:
+                - name: working-dir
+                  value: "{{inputs.parameters.working-dir}}"
+          - name: socketdev
+            template: scan-socketdev
+            arguments:
+              parameters:
+                - name: working-dir
+                  value: "{{inputs.parameters.working-dir}}"
+          - name: syft-grype
+            template: scan-syft-grype
+            arguments:
+              parameters:
+                - name: working-dir
+                  value: "{{inputs.parameters.working-dir}}"
+          - name: pulumi-crossguard
+            template: scan-pulumi-crossguard
+            arguments:
+              parameters:
+                - name: working-dir
+                  value: "{{inputs.parameters.working-dir}}"
+    - name: pipeline-exit-hook
+      container:
+        image: curlimages/curl:8.8.0
+        command:
+          - sh
+          - -c
+        args:
+          - |
+            set -eu
+            echo "Pipeline completed with status: {{workflow.status}}"
+    - name: scan-trufflehog
+      inputs:
+        parameters:
+          - name: working-dir
+      container:
+        image: trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest
+        command:
+          - sh
+          - -c
+        args:
+          - |
+            set -eu
+            mkdir -p /workspace/reports
+            trufflehog filesystem "/workspace/{{inputs.parameters.working-dir}}" --json > /workspace/reports/trufflehog.json || true
+        volumeMounts:
+          - name: workspace
+            mountPath: /workspace
+    - name: scan-semgrep
+      inputs:
+        parameters:
+          - name: working-dir
+      container:
+        image: returntocorp/semgrep:1.85.0
+        command:
+          - sh
+          - -c
+        args:
+          - |
+            set -eu
+            mkdir -p /workspace/reports
+            semgrep scan --config auto --sarif --output /workspace/reports/semgrep.sarif "/workspace/{{inputs.parameters.working-dir}}" || true
+        volumeMounts:
+          - name: workspace
+            mountPath: /workspace
+    - name: scan-kics
+      inputs:
+        parameters:
+          - name: working-dir
+      container:
+        image: checkmarx/kics:1.7.14
+        command:
+          - sh
+          - -c
+        args:
+          - |
+            set -eu
+            mkdir -p /workspace/reports
+            kics scan -p "/workspace/{{inputs.parameters.working-dir}}" -o /workspace/reports --report-formats sarif,json --output-name kics || true
+            if [ -f /workspace/reports/kics.sarif ]; then
+              exit 0
+            fi
+            if [ -f /workspace/reports/kics.json ]; then
+              cp /workspace/reports/kics.json /workspace/reports/kics.sarif
+            fi
+        volumeMounts:
+          - name: workspace
+            mountPath: /workspace
+    - name: scan-socketdev
+      inputs:
+        parameters:
+          - name: working-dir
+      container:
+        image: socketdev/socketcli:latest
+        env:
+          - name: SOCKET_DEV_API_KEY
+            valueFrom:
+              secretKeyRef:
+                name: amp-security-pipeline-secrets
+                key: SOCKET_DEV_API_KEY
+        command:
+          - sh
+          - -c
+        args:
+          - |
+            set -eu
+            mkdir -p /workspace/reports
+            socketdev scan "/workspace/{{inputs.parameters.working-dir}}" --format json --output /workspace/reports/socketdev.json || true
+        volumeMounts:
+          - name: workspace
+            mountPath: /workspace
+    - name: scan-syft-grype
+      inputs:
+        parameters:
+          - name: working-dir
+      container:
+        image: anchore/syft:latest
+        command:
+          - sh
+          - -c
+        args:
+          - |
+            set -eu
+            mkdir -p /workspace/reports
+            syft scan dir:/workspace/{{inputs.parameters.working-dir}} -o cyclonedx-json=/workspace/reports/sbom.json || true
+            grype sbom:/workspace/reports/sbom.json -o sarif=/workspace/reports/grype.sarif || true
+        volumeMounts:
+          - name: workspace
+            mountPath: /workspace
+    - name: scan-pulumi-crossguard
+      inputs:
+        parameters:
+          - name: working-dir
+      container:
+        image: pulumi/pulumi:3.154.0
+        env:
+          - name: PULUMI_ACCESS_TOKEN
+            valueFrom:
+              secretKeyRef:
+                name: amp-security-pipeline-secrets
+                key: PULUMI_ACCESS_TOKEN
+        command:
+          - sh
+          - -c
+        args:
+          - |
+            set -eu
+            mkdir -p /workspace/reports
+            cd "/workspace/{{inputs.parameters.working-dir}}"
+            pulumi preview --policy-pack "policy-pack" > /workspace/reports/pulumi-crossguard.json 2>&1 || true
+        volumeMounts:
+          - name: workspace
+            mountPath: /workspace
+    - name: enforce-policy
+      inputs:
+        parameters:
+          - name: fail-on-cvss
+      container:
+        image: agentguard-tools:latest
+        imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
+        command:
+          - node
+          - /app/dist/enforce-policy.js
+        env:
+          - name: FAIL_ON_CVSS
+            value: "{{inputs.parameters.fail-on-cvss}}"
+        volumeMounts:
+          - name: workspace
+            mountPath: /workspace

docs/security-scope.md

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+# Security Scope and Boundaries
+
+This repository is intentionally a **source, IaC, and dependency scanning pipeline**.
+It is not a complete software supply chain or runtime security platform.
+
+The goal of this document is to make the scope explicit so users understand:
+
+- what this repository is designed to secure
+- what it does not secure
+- what additional controls are still required for a production or homelab deployment pipeline
+- what requirements a sibling pipeline should meet if you want to fill the gaps
+
+## What this repository covers
+
+This repository provides a reusable pre-deploy security gate that scans a repository before deployment proceeds.
+
+Today it covers:
+
+- **Secret scanning** with TruffleHog in the pipeline and Gitleaks in local development guidance.
+- **First-party code scanning** with Semgrep.
+- **Infrastructure-as-code scanning** with KICS.
+- **Dependency risk scanning** with Socket.dev.
+- **SBOM generation and vulnerability scanning** with Syft and Grype.
+- **Policy-pack validation** with Pulumi CrossGuard.
+- **Finding export and triage plumbing** through optional DefectDojo and object storage uploads.
+- **Dependency update automation support** through the Renovate preset and Renovate bot chart in this repository.
+
+In practical terms, this repository is strongest at:
+
+- stopping known-bad or suspicious changes before deploy
+- reducing the chance that AI-generated insecure code or dependencies reach production
+- creating visibility into code, IaC, dependency, and package vulnerability risk
+
+## What this repository does not cover
+
+This repository does **not** attempt to be responsible for every security control in a modern delivery system.
+
+It does not provide:
+
+- **Artifact signing** for container images, packages, or release bundles.
+- **Build provenance / attestations** proving which trusted builder produced an artifact from which source revision.
+- **Admission control verification** that only signed or attested artifacts may deploy.
+- **Runtime threat detection** inside the cluster or host.
+- **Network segmentation or runtime isolation** for the deployed applications.
+- **DAST** or other black-box testing against a live running application.
+- **Repository hosting configuration enforcement** such as branch protection, required reviews, CODEOWNERS, or token restrictions.
+- **Application deployment hardening enforcement** such as checking whether deployed workloads run as non-root, drop capabilities, use read-only root filesystems, or have network policies.
+- **Secure secret delivery for the scanned application** beyond the pipeline's own runtime secret needs.
+- **Incident response, rollback, backup, disaster recovery, or patch SLAs**.
+
+Those areas still matter. They are simply outside the intended scope of this repository.
+
+## Why the scope stops here
+
+The security boundary for this repository is:
+
+1. clone a source repository
+2. scan source, IaC, dependencies, and generated SBOM data
+3. publish findings
+4. fail or pass based on policy
+
+That boundary is useful because it keeps this repository focused, fast, and reusable.
+If artifact build security, deploy admission, and runtime controls are mixed directly into this pipeline, the repository stops being a clear pre-deploy scanner and turns into a broader platform.
+
+This repository should remain the **shift-left scanning gate**, not the entire delivery architecture.
+
+## What a complete deployment pipeline still needs
+
+If you are deploying software after this pipeline passes, you still need additional controls elsewhere.
+
+At a minimum, a production-grade or public homelab deployment flow should also have:
+
+### 1. Repository and change-management controls
+
+These controls protect the trustworthiness of the source before scanning even begins.
+
+Recommended controls:
+
+- branch protection on default and release branches
+- required pull request reviews for sensitive paths
+- `CODEOWNERS` for pipeline, deployment, and policy files
+- restricted direct pushes to protected branches
+- minimal repository admin access
+- mandatory CI status checks before merge
+- protected tags or release branches if releases are tag-driven
+
+This repository can document those requirements, but enforcement belongs in the source control platform.
+
+### 2. Build pipeline controls
+
+These controls establish that build outputs came from a trusted process.
+
+Recommended controls:
+
+- isolated build environment
+- pinned builder images and actions
+- least-privilege credentials for the build system
+- artifact signing for produced container images or release assets
+- provenance / attestation generation for builds
+- immutable artifact storage or registry retention controls
+
+If you want image signing or provenance, that should usually live in the **build pipeline**, because that is where artifacts are actually created.
+
+### 3. Deploy pipeline controls
+
+These controls ensure only approved artifacts and manifests reach the cluster.
+
+Recommended controls:
+
+- verification of image signatures or attestations before deploy
+- enforcement that deployment pulls only from approved registries
+- promotion between environments using immutable digests rather than floating tags
+- deployment-time policy checks for manifests and workload security settings
+- manual approval or staged rollout where risk justifies it
+
+### 4. Runtime and cluster controls
+
+These controls reduce blast radius after deployment.
+
+Recommended controls:
+
+- namespace isolation and least-privilege RBAC
+- workload security contexts
+- non-root containers where possible
+- dropped Linux capabilities
+- read-only root filesystems where possible
+- Kubernetes network policies
+- admission control for workload standards
+- runtime threat detection / alerting
+- centralized logs, metrics, and alerts
+- secrets delivery from a vault or equivalent system
+
+### 5. Recovery and resilience controls
+
+These controls matter because modern guidance assumes prevention will sometimes fail.
+
+Recommended controls:
+
+- tested rollback procedures
+- backups and restore testing
+- credential rotation procedures
+- vulnerability remediation SLAs
+- incident response playbooks
+- inventory of critical services and owners
+
+## Recommended sibling pipeline responsibilities
+
+If you build a second pipeline to fill the gaps, keep the separation of concerns explicit.
+
+A sibling **build and deploy security pipeline** should be responsible for:
+
+- building artifacts in a trusted environment
+- generating SBOMs tied to the built artifact
+- signing artifacts
+- generating provenance / attestations
+- verifying signatures or attestations before deploy
+- enforcing deploy-time policy on manifests and workloads
+- optionally running DAST or post-deploy validation outside the fast PR loop
+
+That keeps this repository focused on source scanning while the sibling pipeline owns artifact trust and deployment trust.
+
+## Mapping this repository to modern security guidance
+
+A concise way to think about the split is:
+
+- **Assume compromise:** this repo helps by enforcing checks before deploy, but recovery and runtime containment live elsewhere.
+- **Defense in depth:** this repo is one layer, not the whole system.
+- **Blast-radius reduction:** this repo can reduce risky changes reaching production, but runtime RBAC, isolation, and network controls are outside its scope.
+- **Zero trust / verified supply chain:** this repo contributes source and dependency scrutiny, but full artifact trust also needs build signing and deploy verification in another pipeline.
+- **Prevention plus detection and recovery:** this repo is primarily a prevention and early-detection layer.
+
+## Minimum expectations for users of this repository
+
+If you adopt this repository, you should assume it is only one part of the security architecture.
+
+At minimum, you should also have:
+
+- repository branch protection and required reviews
+- a secure build pipeline
+- a deployment path that uses immutable artifacts
+- workload hardening standards for deployed applications
+- secret management outside Git
+- logging/monitoring and a plan for response when a scanner finds something important
+
+## Non-goals
+
+To avoid scope creep, the following are non-goals for this repository:
+
+- becoming the authoritative runtime security platform
+- becoming the artifact signing system
+- becoming the deployment admission controller
+- replacing source control platform protections
+- replacing cluster hardening or incident response processes
+
+## Summary
+
+This repository is the **source-side security gate**.
+It helps answer: "Is this code, IaC, dependency set, and generated SBOM safe enough to continue?"
+
+It does **not** answer the full downstream questions:
+
+- "Was the artifact built by a trusted builder?"
+- "Should the cluster admit this artifact?"
+- "Is the running workload isolated and monitored correctly?"
+- "Can we detect, contain, and recover if prevention fails?"
+
+Those controls should exist, but they should live in adjacent repository, build, deploy, and runtime systems rather than being forced into this repository.

helm/values.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "properties": {
+    "pipeline": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "description": "Core Argo workflow settings.",
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "description": "Render the ClusterWorkflowTemplate when true."
+        },
+        "name": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "Name of the ClusterWorkflowTemplate resource.",
+          "minLength": 1
+        },
+        "serviceAccountName": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "Service account used by workflow pods.",
+          "minLength": 1
+        },
+        "workingDir": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "Repository path scanned inside the cloned workspace.",
+          "minLength": 1
+        },
+        "gitRevision": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "Default git revision to clone when the workflow caller does not override it.",
+          "minLength": 1
+        },
+        "failOnCvss": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "CVSS threshold passed to the policy enforcement utility.",
+          "pattern": "^[0-9]+(\\.[0-9]+)?$"
+        },
+        "workspace": {
+          "type": "object",
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "description": "PVC configuration for the shared workspace volume.",
+          "properties": {
+            "storage": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "description": "Requested workspace PVC size, for example 1Gi.",
+              "minLength": 1
+            }
+          },
+          "required": [
+            "storage"
+          ]
+        },
+        "repoName": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "Repository name used in storage upload paths.",
+          "minLength": 1
+        },
+        "scanners": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "description": "Ordered list of scanner templates wired into the scanner fan-out DAG.",
+          "minItems": 1,
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "enum": [
+              "trufflehog",
+              "semgrep",
+              "kics",
+              "socketdev",
+              "syft-grype",
+              "pulumi-crossguard"
+            ]
+          },
+          "uniqueItems": true
+        },
+        "toolsImage": {
+          "type": "object",
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "description": "Custom image that packages the Node utilities used by the workflow.",
+          "properties": {
+            "repository": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "minLength": 1
+            },
+            "tag": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "minLength": 1
+            },
+            "pullPolicy": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "enum": [
+                "Always",
+                "IfNotPresent",
+                "Never"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          "required": [
+            "repository",
+            "tag",
+            "pullPolicy"
+          ]
+        }
+      },
+      "required": [
+        "enabled",
+        "name",
+        "serviceAccountName",
+        "workingDir",
+        "gitRevision",
+        "failOnCvss",
+        "workspace",
+        "repoName",
+        "scanners",
+        "toolsImage"
+      ]
+    },
+    "images": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "description": "Container images used by each workflow step.",
+      "properties": {
+        "git": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
+        "trufflehog": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
+        "semgrep": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
+        "kics": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
+        "socketdev": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
+        "syftGrype": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
+        "pulumiCrossguard": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
+        "awsCli": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
+        "curl": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 }
+      },
+      "required": [
+        "git",
+        "trufflehog",
+        "semgrep",
+        "kics",
+        "socketdev",
+        "syftGrype",
+        "pulumiCrossguard",
+        "awsCli",
+        "curl"
+      ]
+    },
+    "storage": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "description": "Optional raw report upload configuration.",
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": {
+          "type": "boolean"
+        },
+        "reportsBucket": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1
+        },
+        "endpoint": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "Optional custom S3 endpoint for MinIO or another compatible store."
+        }
+      },
+      "required": [
+        "enabled",
+        "reportsBucket",
+        "endpoint"
+      ]
+    },
+    "pulumi": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "description": "Pulumi CrossGuard scanner settings.",
+      "properties": {
+        "policyPackPath": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1
+        }
+      },
+      "required": [
+        "policyPackPath"
+      ]
+    },
+    "defectdojo": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "description": "Optional DefectDojo upload step configuration.",
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": { "type": "boolean" },
+        "productTypeName": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
+        "productName": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
+        "engagementName": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
+        "minimumSeverity": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
+        "active": { "type": "boolean" },
+        "verified": { "type": "boolean" },
+        "closeOldFindings": { "type": "boolean" },
+        "autoCreateContext": { "type": "boolean" }
+      },
+      "required": [
+        "enabled",
+        "productTypeName",
+        "productName",
+        "engagementName",
+        "minimumSeverity",
+        "active",
+        "verified",
+        "closeOldFindings",
+        "autoCreateContext"
+      ]
+    },
+    "infisical": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "description": "Optional Infisical operator integration.",
+      "properties": {
+        "enabled": { "type": "boolean" },
+        "workspaceSlug": { "type": "string" },
+        "projectSlug": { "type": "string" }
+      },
+      "required": [
+        "enabled",
+        "workspaceSlug",
+        "projectSlug"
+      ]
+    }
+  },
+  "required": [
+    "pipeline",
+    "images",
+    "storage",
+    "pulumi",
+    "defectdojo",
+    "infisical"
+  ]
+}

scripts/check-chart.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+repo_root="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || pwd)"
+chart_dir="${repo_root}/helm"
+rendered_manifest="$(mktemp --suffix=.yaml)"
+release_name="${RELEASE_NAME:-agentguard-ci}"
+
+cleanup() {
+  rm -f "${rendered_manifest}"
+}
+
+require_command() {
+  if ! command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    printf 'Missing required command: %s\n' "$1" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+}
+
+run_kubectl_client_check() {
+  require_command kubectl
+  if ! kubectl apply --dry-run=client --validate=false -f "${rendered_manifest}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    cat <<'EOF' >&2
+kubectl client dry-run failed.
+For Argo CRDs, this check can still be environment-sensitive and is optional here.
+Re-run without RUN_KUBECTL_CLIENT_CHECK=1, or use RUN_KUBECTL_SERVER_CHECK=1 against a cluster with the CRDs installed.
+EOF
+    exit 1
+  fi
+}
+
+run_kubectl_server_check() {
+  require_command kubectl
+  kubectl apply --dry-run=server -f "${rendered_manifest}" >/dev/null
+}
+
+trap cleanup EXIT
+
+require_command helm
+require_command argo
+
+printf '==> helm lint\n'
+helm lint "${chart_dir}"
+
+printf '==> helm template\n'
+helm template "${release_name}" "${chart_dir}" > "${rendered_manifest}"
+
+printf '==> argo lint --offline\n'
+argo lint --offline --kinds=clusterworkflowtemplates "${rendered_manifest}"
+
+if [[ "${RUN_KUBECTL_CLIENT_CHECK:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
+  printf '==> kubectl apply --dry-run=client\n'
+  run_kubectl_client_check
+fi
+
+if [[ "${RUN_KUBECTL_SERVER_CHECK:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
+  printf '==> kubectl apply --dry-run=server\n'
+  run_kubectl_server_check
+fi